



# Towards Agnostic Feature-based Dynamic Pricing: Linear Policies vs Linear Valuation with Unknown Noise

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# Outline

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# Dynamic Pricing

## Single-product Pricing



## Feature-based Pricing



# Basic Problem Setting

- An online-fashion sales:

For  $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ :

- **Feature**  $x_t \in \mathbb{R}^d$  is revealed;
- Customer generates a **valuation**  $y_t$  *secretly*;
- Seller (we) propose a **price**  $v_t$ ;
- Customer makes a **decision**  $1_t = 1[v_t \leq y_t]$ ;
- We get a **reward**  $r_t = v_t \cdot 1_t$ .


- Comparing with *contextual bandits*:
  - **Continuous** action and hypothesis spaces

# Problem Modeling

- To make use of  $x_t$ , we consider two problem models:
  - *Linear Policy (LP)*
    - $(x_t, y_t)$  are arbitrarily selected;
    - Compete with  $v_t^* = x_t^\top \beta^*$  for a best fixed  $\beta^*$ .
  - *Linear Valuation (LV)*
    - $y_t = x_t^\top \theta^* + N_t$ , where  $\theta^* \in \mathbb{R}^d$  is fixed and  $N_t \sim_{i.i.d.} \mathbb{D} \subseteq [-1, 1]$ ;
    - Compete with  $v_t^* = \arg \max_v v \cdot \Pr[v \leq y_t]$ .
- **LP** models our *strategy*; **LV** models the *nature*.

Linear Policy (LP)

Linear Valuation (LV)



— Best linear policy

- - - An arbitrary valuation



Known  
Unacceptable



Known  
Acceptable



Unknown  
Unacceptable



Unknown  
Acceptable

— Global optimal pricing policy

- - - Linear Expected Valuation

# LP versus LV: Regret

- LP compete with the *best fixed linear policy*:

$$\text{Regret}_{LP} := \max_{\beta} \sum_{t=1}^T x_t^\top \beta \cdot \mathbb{E}[x_t^\top \beta \leq y_t] - x_t^\top \beta_t \cdot \mathbb{E}[x_t^\top \beta_t \leq y_t]$$

Max expected reward of a fixed linear policy      Expected reward of our (linear) prices

- LV compete with the *best price at each time*

$$\text{Regret}_{LV} := \sum_{t=1}^T \max_v v \cdot \Pr[v \leq x_t^\top \theta^* + N_t | \theta^*, \mathbb{D}] - v_t \cdot \Pr[v_t \leq x_t^\top \theta^* + N_t | \theta^*, \mathbb{D}]$$

Max expected reward at time  $t$       Expected reward of our prices

# Existing Results

Problem	Linear Valuation				Linear Policy
	Noise-free	Known, Log-concave	Parametric	Agnostic, Bounded	
Noise Assumption	Noise-free	Known, Log-concave	Parametric	Agnostic, Bounded	
Upper Regret Bound	$O(d \log \log T)$ [PLS18]	$O(d \log T)$ [XW21]	$\tilde{O}(d\sqrt{T})$ [WTL21]	$\tilde{O}(T^{\frac{3}{4}} + d^{\frac{1}{2}}T^{\frac{5}{8}})$ [This Work]	$\tilde{O}(d^{\frac{1}{3}}T^{\frac{2}{3}})$ [This Work]
Lower Regret Bound	$\Omega(d \log \log T)$ [KL03]	$\Omega(d \log T)$ [JN19]	$\Omega(d\sqrt{T})$ [BK21]	$\tilde{\Omega}(T^{\frac{2}{3}})$ [KL03, This Work]	$\tilde{\Omega}(d^{\frac{1}{3}}T^{\frac{2}{3}})$ [This Work]



# EXP-4 [ACBFS02]: a Contextual Bandit Algorithm

**for**  $t = 1$  **to**  $T$  **do**

Set probability  $p_j(t)$  for each action  $j$  according to weights of all policies;

Get  $a_t$  by Thompson sampling the action set  $A$  according to current probability  $\{p_j(t)\}$ ;

Receive a reward  $r_t$ ;

Construct an *Inverse Propensity Scoring (IPS)* estimator  $\hat{r}_i(t)$  for the reward of each action  $i$ .


Update weights  $w_i$ 's according to  $\hat{r}_i(t)$ .

**end for**

- **Input:** Time horizon  $T$ , action set  $\mathcal{K}$ , policy set  $\Pi$ ; features  $x_t$  at each time
- **Output:** action  $a_t$  at each time
  - approaching optimal policy  $\pi^*$
  - with  $O\left(\sqrt{T|\mathcal{K}|\log|\Pi|}\right)$  regret
- Only works for **finite** action/policy sets.
  - Discretize the price/hypothesis space.


# Discretization: Action Space

- Split the price range into size- $\gamma$  segments.
- Action set consists of all end points



# Discretization: Policy Space (1) --Vector

- Discretize the policy vector space into grids:
  - Cut into size- $\Delta^d$  grids, where  $\Delta = \frac{\gamma}{\sqrt{d}}$ .
  - Total number of  $\beta$ 's:  $\left(\frac{1}{\Delta}\right)^d = \left(\frac{\sqrt{d}}{\gamma}\right)^d$



# Linear-EXP4: Algorithm for LP



- Action  $\mathcal{K} = \{k \cdot \gamma, k = 0, 1, \dots, \lfloor 1/\gamma \rfloor\}$
- Policy  $\Pi = \{\pi_\beta: \pi_\beta(x) = \lfloor x^\top \beta \rfloor_\gamma\}$ , with  $\beta \in$  size- $\Delta^d$  grids.
  - “ $\gamma$ -flooring”:  $\lfloor a \rfloor_\gamma = \left\lfloor \frac{a}{\gamma} \right\rfloor \cdot \gamma$ .
- Let  $\gamma = d^{\frac{1}{3}} T^{-\frac{1}{3}}$ , and the regret =  $\tilde{O}\left(d^{\frac{1}{3}} T^{\frac{2}{3}}\right)$ .
  - Notice that  $|\mathcal{K}| = O\left(\frac{1}{\gamma}\right)$ ,  $|\Pi| = \left(\frac{\sqrt{d}}{\gamma}\right)^d$ ,
  - matching the discretization error  $O(T\gamma)$ .

# Discretization: Policy Space (2) -- Distribution

- In LV, recall:  $y_t = x_t^\top \theta^* + N_t$ 
  - with  $\theta^* \in \mathbb{R}^d$  fixed and  $N_t \sim \mathbb{D}$ .
- If we know  $\theta^*$  and  $\mathbb{D}$ , then ...
$$\pi^*(x) = \arg \max_v v \cdot \Pr[v \leq y_t] = \arg \max_v v \cdot \left(1 - F_{\mathbb{D}}(v - x_t^\top \theta^*)\right)$$
  - $F_{\mathbb{D}}$  is the CDF of  $\mathbb{D}$ .
- Idea: policy built on both  $\hat{\theta}$  and  $\hat{F}_{\mathbb{D}}$ .

# Discretization: Policy Space (2) -- Distribution

- 3 steps to discretize  $F_{\mathbb{D}}$ : Gridding, Flooring, Connecting
- Total number of discrete CDF:  $O\left(2^{\frac{3}{\gamma}}\right)$ 
  - A “balls-in-bins” counting model



# D2-EXP4: Algorithm for LV

- Still, we play the EXP-4:
  - Action  $\mathcal{K} = \{k \cdot \gamma, k = 0, 1, \dots, \lfloor 1/\gamma \rfloor\}$
  - Policy  $\Pi = \{\pi(x; \hat{\theta}, \hat{F}) := \arg \max_v v \cdot (1 - \hat{F}(v - x^\top \hat{\theta})) - (B + 1)\gamma\}$ 
    - $\hat{\theta} \in$  size- $\Delta^d$  grids,  $\hat{F} \in$  discrete CDF family.
    - Subtracting  $(B + 1)\gamma$  for more chance to succeed.
- Choose  $\gamma = T^{-\frac{1}{4}}$ , and  $Regret = \tilde{O}(T^{\frac{3}{4}} + d^{\frac{1}{2}}T^{\frac{5}{8}})$ .
  - Matching the discretization error  $O(T\gamma)$ .
- Prove a  $\tilde{\Omega}(T^{\frac{2}{3}})$  lower bound.

# Property: Half-Lipschitzness

- Noise distribution is not necessarily Lipschitz.
- Probability of acceptance never increases


$$\begin{aligned}
 R(v) &= v \cdot \Pr[v \leq y_t] \\
 &\geq v \cdot \Pr[(v + \delta) \leq y_t] \\
 &\geq (v + \delta) \cdot \Pr[(v + \delta) \leq y_t] - \delta \\
 &= R(v + \delta) - \delta
 \end{aligned}$$

- Expected reward  $R(v)$  increament  $\leq$  Price  $v$  increament
  - We call this property a “**half-Lipschitz**”.
- Therefore, we only suffer  $\delta$ -more regret (*discretization error*) by choosing a  $\delta$ -conservative price, i.e. choosing  $(\hat{v} - \delta)$ .
  - This enables us to discretizing the action/policy spaces



# Numerical Experiments on Linear-EXP4

- A log-log plot of regret
  - $r$ -slope indicates  $O(T^r)$  regret.
- 2/3 in theory, 0.67 in practice
- D2-EXP4 consumes EXP-time!
  - Code released



# Open Problem: Regret Gap of LV

- Our  $\tilde{O}(T^{\frac{3}{4}})$  result holds for **any** noise CDF, w/ or w/o continuity.
- For  $m^{\text{th}}$ -order smooth CDF, [FGY21] shows a  $\tilde{O}(T^{\frac{2m+1}{4m-1}})$  regret.
  - Non-trivial for  $m \geq 2$ .
  - Still unmatched with the  $\tilde{O}(T^{\frac{m+1}{2m+1}})$  lower bound presented in [WCSL21]
- [LS21] achieves a  $\tilde{O}(T^{\frac{2}{3}\nu(1-\alpha)})$  regret by assuming a good estimator  $\hat{\theta}_t: \|\hat{\theta}_t - \theta^*\|_2 = O(t^{-\alpha})$  with logged data.
  - The existence is unknown and is highly non-trivial.

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